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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of school quality on fertility in a transition country. It aims to
explain the slowing fertility and shrinking rural sector of a post Soviet country, Ukraine, through
the decline in the quality of public services, in particular, school quality. It builds on earlier work
of Rosenzweig (1982), which tests for the effects of a change in the price of child quality, mea-
sured here by school quality. Estimates from a generalized Poisson model of fertility show that
school quality has a positive and significant effect on household fertility. Specifically, a 10 %
increase in teacher quality is associated with a 3+% rise in fertility. This positive relationship be-
tween education and fertility distinguishes itself from the negative relationship that is commonly
observed between these two factors. It also suggests that Ukraine should reconsider its population
policies that are aimed at increasing fertility, from short term income transfers for rural families
to long term investments into the quality and equality of their education system.
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1. Introduction
Within the past century, fertility decline has become and will continue to be a pressing theme
within economic development. As countries develop, particularly for those classified as de-
veloping countries, fertility decline is viewed in a positive light and seems to move in tandem
with economic growth. In transition countries, fertility decline has not signaled such a positive
transition. Its economic consequences: a falling labor supply and reduction in human capital, can
threaten a country’s long run growth. In this paper, the fertility crisis of a representative transition
country, Ukraine, is examined, whose population, at current growth rates, will have gone from 52
million in 1991 to 36 million in 2041 (US Census).
Our point of focus is on rural areas in Ukraine. Sustained economic development, particularly
in agricultural and industrial economies like Ukraine’s, begins with increased human capital and
technological advances in the rural economy (Huffman and Orazem, 2007). Greater productivity
in rural areas results in an outflow of skilled labor to urban areas, which promotes further economic
growth in services and trade. In contrast, as Ukraine aspires to integrate with western economies
in its post Soviet era, its slowing fertility, and crumbling rural infrastructure may thwart its efforts
along such a development path.
While much of Eastern Europe shares the experience of a transition from a planned economy to a
market economy, the success of this transition has varied across countries (Kohler et al., 2002). In
many instances, population decline is a result of greater economic prosperity (Stark and Kohler,
2002) and signals the entrance into a second demographic transition. In Ukraine, a decline in
real wages, job uncertainty, increasingly unequal returns to education between urban and rural
areas 2, and the end of high quality public services in education and health care are among the
many realities of the post Soviet transition. Indeed, as Adadjanian and Makarova (2003) points
out, “market reforms brought about social disintegration, widespread poverty, and inequality
rather than quick prosperity." The latter was the social and institutional backdrop during much
of Ukraine’s fertility decline from which emerged an aging population and shrinking labor force
(Rivkin-Fish, 2003). In general, transition countries with a rapidly declining population are weary
of their ability to support pension and social security systems, and fear that long-term innovation
and economic growth will be stifled. (Stark and Kohler, 2002; Maksymenko, 2008; Rozhen, 2005;
Meyers et al.; Bezrukov and Verzhikovskaya, 1994; Volobuyev, 2008).
This paper focuses on linking the impact of deteriorating school quality on fertility occurring in
post Soviet rural Ukraine. We choose to focus on education from among the several deteriorating
2Figures 3-5 shows our estimations to the returns to education for all of Ukraine, and rural and urban areas separately.
The overall country estimates closely match (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova-Peter, 2005; ?)
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factors concomitant with Ukraine’s fertility decline in the last decade, because of its fundamental
role in building a country’s human capital (Osipian, 2008), which demographers, researchers and
policy makers fear is dwindling as a result of depopulation (Bezrukov and Verzhikovskaya, 1994;
Rozhen, 2005). Improvements to school quality may serve as a stimulus for families to invest in
a greater number of high-quality children than Ukraine’s current policies, which provide income
transfers to large rural families. If households tradeoff quantity for quality of their children, as
in Becker and Lewis (1973), then an exogenous variation in the quality of a child’s education,
a primary input into the quality of a child, should have a significant impact on the quantity of
children that a household chooses. This is particularly true in a country like Ukraine. Educational
attainment remains high (figure 6) at the secondary school level, but school quality has undergone
considerable dispersion between urban and rural areas since the fall of the Soviet Union and the
reduction of state spending on public services (Bekh et al., 2007).
The results confirm that school quality is a factor with significant influence on fertility. Using
household level data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey in 2003, and the
Ukrainian School Survey of 2005, the estimates reveal that a 10% increase in teacher quality
increases fertility by 3+% in rural areas. These results remain robust even after controlling for
other possible trends that may account for school quality’s significant effect on fertility.
This finding runs counter to the commonly observed negative relationship between education
and fertility. The view that schooling and fertility are substitutes follows from Becker and
Lewis (1973), whose research shows that if a household trades off quantity for quality in their
children then the shadow prices of each variable are a function of the other respective variable.
Consequently, a rise in household income will result in an initial decline in fertility, assuming
greater income elasticity of quality vs. quantity of children, followed by an additional drop in
fertility due to the rising shadow price of quantity as quality increases. Rising incomes coupled
with a household’s quantity-quality tradeoff, results in the household’s substitution away from
quantity of children into quality of children. Empirical confirmation of this theory is mixed.
Hanushek and Wössmann (2007), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), and Todd and Wolpin (1973)
find a negative correlation between children’s education attainment and family size, while Angrist
et al. (2006) find no evidence of a quantity-quality tradeoff.
The latter pattern of development, of rising incomes and declining fertility, in addition to declining
adult mortality (US Census), and postponement of age at first marriage and birth, cannot explain
the demographic and economic patterns of Ukraine from 1991-2003. Real wages, and the total
fertility rate (figures 7 and 8) were both declining until 2000, and the disparity in poverty between
rural and urban areas rose through 2003 (Murragara, 2005). Age at first marriage has not declined
(figure 9), and adult mortality has risen (US Census). Ukraine’s story does not mimic the evolution
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of developing countries like Bangladesh, India, or Brazil, where rural livelihoods have improved
over the past century while fertility rates have slowed (Asefa, 2005). Nor does it match the trends
of its western European neighbors, such as France or Italy, where fertility rates are also among the
world’s lowest, but marriage and first births are being postponed, adult mortality is declining, and
whose economies have been developed for decades (Gabriel, 2005).
Some past work on transition countries, nevertheless, points to the decline in real income as
a causal factor of fertility decline. (Wanner and Dudwick, 1999; Adadjanian and Makarova,
2003). However, these analyses are limited in their analysis of institutional factors that were
weighing on parental decisions beyond changes in income.3 During Soviet times, “Many of the
costs commonly associated with parenthood in Western countries were actually externalized from
family resource allocation problems. While these state subsidies did not result in huge families,
they effectively mitigated the relationship between a couple’s personal finances and fertility
decisions" (Grogan, 2006). Therefore, it is relevant and requisite that we look at, in addition to
income, the effects of other economic determinants of fertility, particularly since one of the most
detrimental aspects of the dissolution of the Soviet system was the sudden demise of high quality
public services, as with education and health care (Wanner and Dudwick, 1999). The worsening
of socio-economic prospects came as a considerable blow, particularly in rural areas, to a nation
with high standards in education (99% literacy (CIA World Factbook)) and high expectations for
their children.
By studying the impact of public services on fertility, such as education quality, which directly af-
fects the cost of children, we are considering how the price of children affects the quantity-quality
tradeoff in children in addition to the more commonly researched affects of household income.
The implications of a price effect can potentially explain the economic and demographic patterns
of Ukraine contrary to the implications of a change in income. Unlike Becker’s proposed negative
relationship between fertility and income, the effect of rising child costs on fertility is theoretically
ambiguous, and has been shown to be empirically negative, though statistically insignificant, in
Rosenzweig (1982). Therefore, the deterioration of education quality, synonymous with rising
child quality prices (Glewwe, 1999), may be a significant and theoretically plausible explanation
for this transition country’s fertility decline and a dwindling rural economy. We also control for
labor and non-labor income, where non-labor income generally exhibits a negative effect total
fertility, and real male wages exhibit a positive effect.
3They also fail to differentiate between labor and non-labor income, where the the Becker household theory actually
refers to changes in non-labor income, not real wages. Our results confer with Becker’s negative effects of non-
labor income on total fertility.
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In Section 2 the predictions of a change in the price of child quality on child quantity for a house-
hold are presented, demonstrating the ambiguous effect of rising child quality prices. Section 3
describes the data and variables used to estimate the effect of school quality on household fertility.
Section 4 lays out the empirical specification to test the theoretical model, and confirms that
school quality has a significant impact on household fertility. Section 5 examines the robustness of
the findings by including additional explanatory variables, which may account for school quality’s
impact on fertility. Section 5.1 and 5.2 employ three additional estimations with the data. Section
6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the results in contrast to the Ukrainian
government’s current policies.
2. Model
To predict the effects of changes in the price of quality we formulate a model where households
value the quantity of children, N, and quality of children, Q, in addition to commodities, S, repre-
sented by the utility function
U(N,Q,S)
(Becker and Lewis, 1973). The household budget constraint is given by
F = NQΠ+ pNN+ pQQ+ pSS
as in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), where F denotes full income, Π is the price of child quality,
reflected by the school quality that a household faces, and pN , pQ, and pS are the fixed cost prices
for N, Q, and S, independent of the levels of each of the other variables4. NQΠ is a non-linear term
of the budget constraint which generates quantity and quality shadow prices that are a function of
the other variable.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the first order conditions for an interior solution:
(3) UN = λ [ΠQ+ pN ]
(4) UQ = λ [ΠN+ pQ]
(5) US = λ pS
(6) F = NQΠ+ pNN+ pQQ+ pSS
4For example, pQ may reflect the price of living in a certain neighborhood, and pN may reflect the price of necessary
child products.
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The total effects of changing the cost of child quality on fertility is obtained by totally differenti-
ating (3)-(6) and solving for dNdΠ and
dQ
dΠ
5.
(7) dNdΠ =
λQφ22
Φ − λNφ23Φ +NQdNdF
(8) dQdΠ =
λQφ32
Φ − λNφ33Φ −NQdNdF
The impact of a change in the price of child quality on the number of children chosen by a
household, dNdΠ , will depend on the three factors: cross price effects, own price effects, and an
income effect. The first term in (7) reflects the negative own price effects of a change in Π, such
that a rise in the price of child quality reduces the fertility of a woman. The second term reflects
the positive cross price effect on the number of children. Namely, a rise in the price of child
quality causes child quantity to become relatively cheaper, increasing N. The third term reflects
that the magnitude and sign of dNdΠ will depend on the household’s response to changes in income.
As in Rosenzweig (1982), for compensated changes in the price of school quality, Π, the change
in N is negative if own price effects dominate cross price effects. Namely, a rise in the price of
child quality will lead to a decline in fertility, because each child is costlier to raise. Conversely,
the change in N with respect to a change in Π is positive if cross price effects dominate own price
effects6, and the quantity of children is relatively cheaper.
We expect that negative own price effects will dominate positive cross price effects for a country
like Ukraine. Firstly, we believe that preferences for child quality are high as revealed by
consistently high national literacy rates, and traditionally high expectations for state schooling.
Therefore, a rise in the price of child quality is expected to trigger declines in the number of
children in order to maintain a constant level of child quality. This assumes however, that there are
no strong complementarities between public provision of inputs into child quality, such as school
quality, and parent’s own provision of inputs into their child’s quality. For instance, if the price
of child quality were to decline, such that school quality improves for secondary education and
the first term on the right hand side of (7) is positive, parents may complement this by increasing
their investments into their child’s tertiary education. This would ultimately make each additional
child more costly if complementarities are strong enough, and could actually reduce household
fertility, represented by a negative sign on the second term of the right hand side of (7). This
scenario could describe how parental investments are made in a country like the U.S., but it
does not describe the typical child investment of Ukrainian families. In Ukraine, an individual’s
5See appendix.
6See appendix for derivation.
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educational fate is deemed largely as a product of the state and deserving students are awarded
a free higher education. One could bribe their child’s way through the university system, which
could be a considered as an investment into a child’s higher education, but this is often feasible
only for children of parents with disproportionate levels of wealth that were accumulated after
the fall of the Soviet Union 7. Lastly, at least in rural areas, the returns to higher education have
been steadily declining over time (figure 4), rendering formal higher education a less profitable
endeavor than say entering the informal business sector. 8 Therefore, we view a change in state
school quality independently from any endogenous parental choices for child quality, and believe
that negative own price effects will dominate.
3. Data
The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 2003 (ULMS) is based on a national stratified
random sample of 4096 households. The survey began only in 2003, but includes retroactive
wage data for 1986, 1991, and continuous wage data from 1997 to 2003. The 2003 data
span individual characteristics of household members such as age and timing of births, mar-
ital history, education and skills, changes in residence, health, and attitudes on politics and ecology.
The Ukrainian School Survey 2005 (USS) is a cross section of 417 Ukrainian public primary and9
schools selected to match with a random sample of settlements chosen for Ukraine’s Annual Health
and Living Condition Survey, which is conducted by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
The 2005 cross-section was conducted under the auspices of the World Bank’s project “Equal Ac-
cess to Quality Education in Ukraine" with the intentions of creating a follow-up survey in 2009,
when the project is completed. The USS contains information on physical infrastructure of the
school, teachers’ qualifications, hours, and satisfaction, student absenteeism, and school resources.
It would be ideal to utilize the full panel data of the ULMS as other papers have done, which study
its wage data (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova-Peter, 2005; Lehmann et al., 2006), however, due
to the cross sectional nature of the USS this is not possible as of yet. In matching these datasets
by oblast10 and settlement types, it is assumed that school quality in 2005 is a good proxy for the
school quality that women of childbearing years in 2003 confront when deciding on whether or
7called “New Russians"
8The returns to higher education has been steadily rising over time in urban areas, but it is likely to do unobservable
characteristics of those attending higher education, namely children of oligarchs and the "New Russians".
9The Ukrainian education system includes preschool, elementary (primary), lower-secondary, upper-secondary, and
tertiary education (Bekh et al., 2007).
10There are 24 oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine. An oblast is comparable to a state in the
US.
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not to have additional child.
3.1. Variables
The dependent variable is the number of children born to a female up to 200311. Estimates are pre-
sented for rural and urban areas for comparative purposes, but our main point of focus is on rural
areas 12. Cohorts younger than forty have not yet completed their fertile years in our sample, so age
effects must be controlled for with the year a female was born. Similarly, cohort effects, namely,
that our results are driven by the behavior of a particular cohort of women, should be controlled
for. Estimations are therefore repeated for smaller samples of women of only 10 year age intervals.
Although this research examines the impact of school quality on fertility, it is actually the slowing
of child-births, not reduced fertility that can be determined. Without observing all females to the
completion of their fertile years, we are unable to determine whether a lower total fertility rate
(TFR)13 is the result of persistently lower fertility or simply delayed child bearing.
Nonetheless, the previous decade showed no indication that declining TFR’s were being driven by
a postponement of first child-births, greater spacing between children, or delayed first marriage
(Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003), suggesting that low TFR’s are a long term trend unlikely to reverse
itself. In fact, as shown in figures 9 and 10, mean age at first marriage (MAFM) and mean age at
first birth (MAFB) have remained fairly stable since the fall of the Soviet Union through 2003,
at 22-23 for MAFM, and 23-24 for MAFB in our sample (Perelli-Harris, 2005; Philipov and
Dorbritz, 2003). The real decline seems to be driven by a drop-off in second and third order births
(Perelli-Harris, 2005). These types of changes in family size are not reflected in a measure like the
TFR.
Income of the household is separated into non-earnings income and wages of the male. Females’
wages are not controlled for directly, as fertility has an effect on a female’s decision to work,
therefore her income is clearly not exogenous. The opportunity cost of a woman’s time will be
controlled for by including predicted female wages. Because all members of a household record
identical total household income, the latter is divided by the number of adults in the household
11To avoid endogeneity of the age variable from teenage pregnancies, the sample is restricted to females who have
passed the age range for secondary education. Because we have detailed data on household structure, we are able
to identify females of reproductive age in each household and the number of children that they have.
12We classify rural areas as settlement types labeled as“village" or“settlement of a town significance". The full clas-
sification of settlement types includes: “village", “settlement of town significance", “small town" (up to 20,000),
“medium town" (20,000 - 99,000), “city" (100,000 - 499,000), and “big city’ (more than 500,00)
13The TFR is the sum of age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) for a given year, assuming that all women face the ASFR’s
of a given year, and survive through their reproductive years.
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to account for family size14. For husbands who report that they are working, but whose wages
are not available, predicted wages are used15. In some instances married females’ husbands were
not interviewed, and therefore a predicted wage based on the male’s individual characteristics
is unattainable. In such cases, the mean male wage associated with a female of a given age,
education, state and settlement type is assigned to the female. This assumes that some degree
of assortative mating based on individuals’ age, education and location is occurring. Additional
household characteristics are controlled for later as we aim to rule out other possible explanations
for the significance of school quality in explaining household fertility.
3.2. School Quality
A substantial literature involving measurements of school quality exists in the labor economics
literature, primarily within the context of estimating the returns to education. Several studies use
per pupil expenditures (Rosenzweig, 1977; Johnson and Stafford, 1973; Rizzuto and Wachtel,
1980). However, such a measure would be inappropriate for this study. In Ukraine, some
education authorities must rely on their personal connections to reach a reasonable level of
educational funding. Therefore, a published expenditure statistic would poorly represent actual
per pupil funding, particularly if corruption plagues the eventual allocation of those funds as well
(Shcherbatyuk, 2007). Other studies turn to school quality variables that can be seen as policy
instruments as opposed to schooling outcomes: student teacher ratios, relative teacher pay, extent
of computer use and training, percentage of teachers with a masters degree or higher, books per
student, and type of school (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983; Card and Krueger, 1992; Boozer et al.,
1992; Betts, 1995, 2001; Dearden et al., 2002).
This study uses school quality variables which reflect the human capital of schools. Physical qual-
ity variables are avoided as they are particularly vulnerable to issues of endogeneity. In general,
the majority (99.7%) of state general education establishments are subordinated to the Ministry of
Education and Science of Ukraine (Paraschenko, 2004), and therefore state funded. For additional
funding, the local education department can request additional funds from either the community,
which can then forward the request to the regional level and further to the government, or cut back
on its own funds in terms of utility services and investment programs (Lukovenko and Kopets,
2001). The remainder of funds can often come from individuals or community organizations
14Income is also scaled by 100,000.
15Wages for adult males of working age were estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure. The first stage esti-
mation for the ith male to work is given by worki = xi ∗B = a+b∗maritalstatusi+ c∗numbero f childreni+d ∗
educationi+ e∗agei+ f ∗oblasti+g∗ settlementtypei+ errori, where worki = 1 if male worked and zero other-
wise. The prediction of wages is given by the Mincerian estimation: ln(wage)i = α+β ∗ educationi+ γ ∗agei+
δ ∗agesquaredi+ ε ∗λi+ errori, where λ is the Inverse Mills ratio= f (xi∗B)F(xi∗B) . Marital status ranges from “single”,
“in a registered marriage”, “in a non-registered marriage”, “separated”, “divorced” or “widowed”.
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to help supply schools with better equipment. For instance, the International Centre for Policy
Studies (ICPS) in Ukraine states that wealthy parents may supply resources to schools to improve
conditions (Shcherbatyuk, 2007). Hence, physical quality variables are likely to be correlated with
unobservable household characteristics that we cannot control for in cross-sectional data. For this
reason, variables, which seem less vulnerable to household specific control of school quality, are
chosen. Following Behrman and Birdsall (1983), the quality of teachers is controlled for with the
percent of teachers with a higher degree (masters and specialists). The second control for school
quality is student-teacher ratios.
As in Behrman and Birdsall (1983), Card and Krueger (1992), and Ulubas-og and Cardak (2007),
aggregate measures of school quality are assigned to each household. We first calculate school
quality values by oblast and settlement type, and then assign a household their corresponding
school quality by the oblast and settlement type in which they live.
3.3. Addressing Endogeneity of School Quality
For both school quality variables we argue that our measures are exogenous to fertility choices
in rural areas. The lack of available substitutes for public schooling in rural areas, restricted
choice amongst public schools, and exogenous deterioration of public school quality following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides us with a method of identifying the effects of school
quality on fertility.
There is, however, the possibility that both variables may be endogenous to fertility decisions,
hindering our identification, via sorting, selection effects, or reverse causality. Possible reasons
for concern include whether parents are able to sort to areas with with higher school quality,
parents are able donate funds to their local public school to improve conditions, or if past local
levels of fertility affected school quality in areas where a large proportion of the voting population
had school age children (Grob and Wolter, 2007). The first is a possibility if private schooling
options are available, as in urban areas (Shcherbatyuk, 2007). However, private options are rarely
available in rural areas, and, furthermore, beyond the means of rural incomes. Furthermore, by
the Ukrainian“propiska" system (a system of civil registration within one’s district), children are
required to attend the public school in their district supporting our identification of school quality.
Lastly, to control for the reverse causality mentioned above, we include a lag of crude birth rates
(CBRs) by settlement type and oblast 16, that is a five year average of CBRs from 1995-1999 17
16CBR= numberbirthstotalpopulation
17A lagged five year average from 1995-1999.
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It is also possible that teacher quality is endogenous due to parental donations to local public
school. Namely, wealthier families may donate more money to their public school, which can then
hire higher quality teachers. This seems unlikely, however, since paying a sufficient teacher salary
to attract better teachers takes considerable coordination and more income than funding school
supplies. Furthermore, wages and incomes in rural Ukraine are often so low that donations could
not amount to substantial school improvements. In 2000, 31% of the Ukrainian population lived
on less than $2 dollars a day (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). In rural
Ukraine, between 20 and 30% of the population18was found to live in poverty in 200319.
Nevertheless, if unobservable household characteristics, which determine income, can also
affect school quality through parental donations, then controlling for parental donations should
account for some of these unknowns. We therefore control for average parental donations to
schools per student per year in tables 3-4 and 6-7, which range from an average of $9 US dol-
lars per student per year in rural areas to an average of $20 per student per year in large urban cities.
Another possible concern is that households with higher incomes or education may be moving
to areas with better schools. To see whether there are significant differences across observable
household characteristics, such as income and education for areas with lower and higher school
quality, the data are summarized over four quantiles of school quality in rural areas in table 2. The
reported F-statistics indicate that there are significant differences in income, age, and education
of mothers between areas of the lowest and highest quantiles of school quality. For non-earnings
income (HHinc), this relationship is not linear, such that households with more assets do not nec-
essarily sort to areas with better schools, while it is for male wages (lnmwage). Fortunately, we
are able to control for male wages and their type of job. We will also be able to control for whether
a household has moved, which may serve as a proxy for the mobility of a household and other
unobservable characteristics that would enable a household to sort to areas with better school qual-
ity. That is, districts with better school quality may be comprised of, not necessarily more wealthy
households, but households which are somehow more mobile or better connected to relatives.
1820% in small settlement type towns, and 30% in villages.
19“Poverty is defined as those individuals whose consumption falls below a level sufficient to cover the cost of a food
basket of about 2500 calories per day, plus a significant allowance for non-food goods and services. This level
of calories reflects the country’s minimum calorie requirements according to the consumption patterns and the
demographic composition of the populations. The cost of this basket is UAH 151 per person per month in 2003"
(Bekh et al., 2007).
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4. Empirical Specification
To estimate the effects of school quality on fertility a count data model is used. Specifically, a
generalized Poisson model20 is employed to account for possible under or over-dispersion in the
fertility data. As Wang and Famoye (1997) and Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1994) point out,
the number of children in a household tends to exhibit under-dispersion when the mode is equal
to two. However, our data appear to be over-dispersed, with a mode of one for the number of
children per household, and standard deviation of 1.821.
The mean of fertility for the ith woman, who faces the school quality of the kth oblast and jth
settlement type is given be:
µi = exp(α+β ∗agei+ γ ∗HHinci+δ ∗ lnmwagei+ ε ∗ teachqk j+ζ ∗ stratiok j)
where “HHinc” is non-earnings income per adult household member22, “lnmwage” is the natural
log of males’ wages, “teachq” is teacher quality or percent of teachers with a degree beyond the
bachelors, and “stratio” is the student teacher ratio. Summary statistics for both rural and urban
areas of females ages 20-40 in 2003 are included in tables 1a and 1b.
4.1. Results
Elasticities evaluated at mean values for women, aged 20-40, and for the smaller ten year cohort
25-35 in rural areas are reported in tables 3-5. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and clustering of the residuals at the village level. For rural tables, z statistics are also computed
using block-bootstrapped standard errors.
The dispersion statistics reported for each model indicate that the data are over-dispersed as
hypothesized earlier, as α , the dispersion parameter, is positive for all sub-samples. This confirms
that a standard Poisson model would produce inefficient estimates. Furthermore, the AIC statistic
20 The generalized Poisson distribution is given by
f (yi|µ,α) = µ1+αµ
y
i
(1+αyi)yi−1
yi
exp(
−µ(1+αyi)
(1+αµ)
)
where yi=0,1,2,... and µi= exp(xiβ ). The mean and variance of yi are E(yi|xi)= µi and theV (yi|xi)= µi(1+αµi)2.
Note that when α , the dispersion parameter, equals zero, the generalized Poisson distribution reduces to the Poisson
distribution.
21Under-dispersion occurs when the variance of a variable is less than its mean, and conversely for over-dispersion.
Estimates from a Poisson regression model, which assumes equi-dispersion, will be consistent but not efficient.
Hence, test statistics based on the standard errors are no longer valid.
22Child benefits and alimony were excluded from “HHinc" to avoid endogeneity.
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indicates the in all cases the generalized Poisson is a better fit than the standard Poisson, given the
smaller values for the AIC under the generalized Poisson.
For the full sample, non-earnings income, “HHinc" 23, has a negative effect on household fertility,
as Becker and Lewis (1973) predicts. This is also true for the 25-35 cohort, whereas the natural
log of male wages (“lnmwage") has a positive and significant effect on the total number of births
to a female.
The school quality variables are both significant, and indicate that better outcomes (higher teacher
quality and lower student teacher ratios) in school quality have a positive effect on fertility in rural
areas. In table 3, estimates for the full sample of women reveal that a 10% reduction in student
teacher ratios increases fertility by 1.4%, while a 10% increase in teacher quality increases fertility
by 3%. This suggests that the negative own price effects of a change in the price of child quality
dominates the cross price effects, as better school quality (or a decline in the price of child quality)
leads to higher fertility. This is consistent with Rosenzweig’s (1982) results, though our results
are statistically significant. This lends evidence to the hypothesis that even after controlling for
the negative effects of income on fertility, a rise in the price of child costs can significantly reduce
fertility.
Furthermore, controlling for “parentDon", average parental donations per student per year (in
hryven), “moved", a dummy variable for whether a family has moved, and “cbr" 24, which are
meant to proxy for some unobservable household characteristics, does not affect the significance
of school quality’s impact on fertility. “Moved" has a positive and significant effect on fertility in
table 3, column 4, as does “cbr" in table 3, column 5, while the effect of “parentDon" is negative
and significant in table 3, column 3. Therefore, average parental donations per student to schools
may reflect an additional negative income effect on fertility, the mobility of a family is perhaps
effective at reducing the cost of a child, and reverse causality does not appear to be driving our
results.
5. Trends and Robustness
Thus far our results show that the price of child quality, as measured by school quality, has a
significant impact on household fertility. However, there are other economic factors in Ukraine
that are leading to fertility decline as well; the decline in health care quality (Murragara, 2005;
Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003; Buslayeva et al., 1999); a rise in the opportunity cost of women’s
23Sold goods and services are included in “HHinc".
24CBR= numberbirthstotalpopulation
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time (Perelli-Harris, 2006), particularly for low wage earners as the gap between male female
wage floors has narrowed (Ganguli and Terrell, 2005); and a structural shift from an agricultural
and industrial based economy to services, telecommunications and trade (Philipov and Dorbritz,
2003), which could greatly affect the employment and wages of males in rural areas. There are
other social factors, such as increased divorce and extra-marital birth rates, the spread of AIDS,
and increased alcoholism, which have been related to decreased fertility in Ukraine. While the
latter factors have moved in tandem with fertility decline (Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003), they too
should be thought of as outcomes of the above mentioned economic shifts that had taken place
over the previous decade. The acceptance of single parenting may have developed with the estab-
lishment and adjustments of the minimum wage, which substantially improved the male-female
wage gaps within lower wage quantiles (Ganguli and Terrell, 2005). Alcoholism among men,
particularly in rural areas, is often attributed to the contraction of agricultural and industrial sectors.
Therefore, the focus in this section is to acknowledge other economic factors of fertility decline in
Ukraine, but more importantly, to ask whether controlling for these other factors in our estimation
will then render school quality an insignificant determinant of household fertility. For example, if
better schools are observed in areas with better infrastructure and increased job opportunities for
women, then a significant impact of school quality on fertility may be capturing women’s labor
decisions to work more. To deal with this, predicted wages of women who work and do not work
are estimated and controlled for25.
Because the mean age at first birth is 24 (see figure 10), the birthing cohort that we will focus on
for robustness is females ages 25-35 in 2003. Table 5, column 2 indicates that the log of predicted
female wages has a negative though not significant impact on fertility. After controlling for
mother’s own education (column 3) the effect becomes positive, indicating that women of equal
education with higher potential wages, holding all else constant, will have more children. School
quality, nonetheless, remains significant.
We next include job type in our estimation to control for the contraction of agricultural and
industrial sectors in rural areas. It is possible that areas with lower school quality are perhaps
areas with more depressed economies due to the shift from agriculture and industry to services,
telecommunications and trade. Therefore, a male’s job type, rather than local school quality,
may be the true cause for reduced fertility. “Agindust", a dummy variable indicating whether a
husband’s occupation is in the agricultural or industrial sector, does have a small affect on the level
of significance of school quality in table 3, column 7, although, both school quality and student
teacher ratios remain statistically significant. We would expect that school quality would be
downward biased in this case since agricultural and industrial areas would be more economically
25The Heckman procedure for predicting female wages is the same as in the prediction of missing male wages.
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depressed and have worse schools. Indeed, the estimates for teacher quality increase in absolute
value after controlling for job type.
It is possible that school quality is acting as a general control for other public services, most
notably health services, which have also been in decline since the fall of the Soviet Union
(Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003; Buslayeva et al., 1999). Lack of reproductive health services, for
example, could deter females from child bearing. However, not having data on health services we
cannot control for its separate effect on fertility. Nevertheless, even if school quality is acting as a
catch-all variable for the decline in government services in rural areas, this does not detract from
the thesis that the price of child quality has a negative effect on fertility, as many public services
can be thought of as an input into the quality of a child.
We are, however, able to control for a female’s own health. This may serve as a proxy for
quality of health care, as healthier individuals potentially have better preventative health care. The
variable captures an individual’s response to "How would you evaluate your health?", with the
reported answer ranging from 1(=Very good) to 4(=Bad). Inclusion of this health variable in table
3, column 8 does not alter the results, nor is it significant in its affect on fertility.
In addition to controlling for economic factors that may be potentially driving our results, controls
for household characteristics that may be associated with school quality should be considered.
For example, language spoken at home creates a distinct separation among Ukrainian citizens:
politically, religiously, and geographically. A clear majority of Russian speakers live in urban
areas in eastern Ukraine, particularly in industrial cities, and are of the Eastern Orthodox rite.
Stronger affiliation with one of these linguistic groups may be correlated with the school quality
that a household faces, as well as their fertility. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union
the majority of school instruction was in Russian. Now, all schools are required to teach in
Ukrainian. Although we cannot posit a clear relationship between language and school quality,
it is possible that the change in the language of instruction affected some schools positively
and some negatively. Furthermore, Buslayeva et al. (1999) shows that language and fertility
are correlated. Abortions are more common among Russian speaking eastern Ukrainians. The
latter facts could be leading us to a spurious correlation between fertility and school quality.
A similar argument can be made for religious affiliation and fertility. Catholic households in
Ukraine tend to eschew abortion and exhibit higher birth rates than households of the Eastern
Orthodox rite (Buslayeva et al., 1999). Controlling for language and religious affiliation26 in table
3, column 5 and 6, with dummy variables for Russian speakers and households that consider them-
selves Catholic, does confirm that Russian speaking individuals tend to have fewer children, and
26language=1 if a Russian speaker and Catholic=1 if Catholic.
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that Catholics tend to have larger families, through the effects of teacher quality remain significant.
Lastly, we control for marital status with “marital" in column 10, table 5 and table 8, where marital
equal to one indicates that a female is in a registered or non-registered marriage and is single
or alone otherwise. Not suprisingly, being in a relationship increases a female’s fertility, though
school quality remains significant in the expected direction.
5.1. Robustness Check with Later Births
One criticism of the above specification is that some of the observed births occurred before the
2004-2005 USS survey. While school quality may have affected later births, of say a woman
of 35 years of age in 2003, her first birth could have occurred a decade before that, such
that 2004/2005 school quality data would not be relevant to her initial fertility decisions. To
check that school quality has an affect on births occurring no more than 5 years earlier than
the USS survey, namely from 1999 onwards, we tested the above model using two separate
specifications. The first specification uses “lastbirths" as a regressand in generalized poisson
model, which counts the number of births a female conceived from 1999 onwards, and controls
for the number of “priorbirths" up until 1999. The second specification uses “Dlatebirths" as a
regressand in a probit model, which is a dummy indicating whether a woman conceived a child in
1999 onwards, and “priorbirths" as a regressor. Women age 25-35 are included in this specification.
Table 9 indicates that teacher quality remains positive and significant for this cohort, and student
teacher ratio is negative but not significant in both specifications. Therefore, school quality has
significant affects on the decisions to conceive children for the period surrounding school quality
measurement, even after controlling for prior births, year of female’s birth, household income,
and male’s wages. This confirms that school quality is affecting female’s fertility decision for the
period 1999-2003, where school quality in 2004 is a proxy for school quality for the five prior
years.
5.2. Duration Analysis
The fertility decline in Ukraine has been attributed to a drop off in higher order births rather than
childlessness, “providing evidence that Ukraine has not shifted to a Western European fertility
pattern. (Perelli-Harris, 2005). We estimate the impact of school quality on the number of months
between time between age at first marriage and first birth, and the number of months between first
and second births using a gamma and log-log parametric hazard model. The graphs for duration
between marriage and first birth and between first and second births are presented in figures 1 and
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2. The marriage to first birth 27 smoothed hazard estimate is non-monotonic and is estimated using
a gamma parametric model for the hazard function 28, while the first and second birth smoothed
hazard estimate clearly follows a log-log or log normal shape hazard function 29.
Table 10, column 1 indicates that teacher quality slightly decelerates the time from first marriage
to first birth by 4%, though the results are not statistically significant, while student teacher ratios
have little effect. Table 10, column 2 indicates that higher teacher quality accelerates the time
between first and second births by 85%. This supports Perelli-Harris (2005) the theory that fertility
decline in Ukraine is driven by the drop-off in second births, while maintaining a fairly young
mean age at first marriage, rather than the Western European demographic model of childlessness
accompanied by a later mean age at first marriage (Gabriel, 2005).
These results reveal a very different story from that of a demographic transition for Ukraine.
Concurrent with fertility decline in Ukraine, we do not observe the typical trends of a demo-
graphic transition in Ukraine: rising incomes, delayed first marriage and first birth, and a rise in
childlessness over the decade succeeding transition. Therefore, we look beyond these measures to
help explain fertility decline in Ukraine in the face of declining real wages, unchanged age a first
marriage and first birth, and a dropoff of in second births. This section shows that the dissolution of
at least one public service, school quality, can explain both the overall decline in fertility, but also
the very source of that average decline, namely a postponement or cessation of higher parity births.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
The question of whether school quality affects fertility is motivated by the observed fertility
declines and concomitant dispersion in school quality in Ukraine following the breakup of the
Soviet Union. This research finds that the price of schooling, as measured by school quality,
can have a significant impact on a female’s fertility, particularly for those females who face few
schooling options for their children, and who do not move to urban areas with greater choice in
schooling options. As in Rosenzweig (1982), we find that the price of schooling has a negative
impact on fertility, but our results are significant contrary to Rosenzweig’s findings. This work is
the first to provide a potential cause for fertility decline in rural Ukraine, as well to test the effects
of price changes in child quality on fertility in the context of a quantity-quality household model.
27One hundred twenty-six observations are dropped for females conceiving their first child before first marriage.
28The gamma hazard function is specified as λ (t) = x
γ−1e−x
Γ(γ)−Γx(γ) , given that it can take on multiple shapes, where x≥ 0
and γ ≥ 0, and Γ(.) is the gamma distribution.
29The log-log hazard function is specified as λ (t) = γαt
α−1
1+γtα , where γ,α ≥ 0 Wooldridge (2002). The estimates are not
significantly or economically different, therefore, we just report the log-log estimates.
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Thus far, the Ukrainian government’s response to the fertility decline and contraction of the
rural economy has been direct subsidization to rural households. President Yushchenko’s 2008
presidential bill calls for a 50 percent increase in subsidies to large rural families. The payout plan
is $2,378 for the first child, $4,955 for the second, and $9,910 for the third.
“It pains me to see the dropping birth rate and outflow of dispirited young villagers
to the cities. There’s a lack of schools and teachers, bus programs have failed, and
hospitals and first aid centers are closed. Not every village is linked by the bus service
to its district town. There is no access to the internet. Let me assure you that I will not
sign the 2008 budget into law until the needs of farmers and rural people are adequately
met. " (Yushchenko, 2007).
Ukrainian demographers, however, are skeptical of such policies, which may speed up the tempo
of births, as mothers aim to qualify for child subsidies, but will not increase the overall quantity
of births per woman. Furthermore, short term income transfers may increase the rural labor force,
but they do not address the fact that sustained economic development requires a constant flow of
human capital that will foster entrepreneurship, attract foreign investment, and facilitate an equal
balance of human capital between rural and urban areas.
Although, the Ukrainian government acknowledges the failure of public services in rural Ukraine,
the connection between public good provision and fertility decline has not been recognized.
What is needed are credible investments in public services, such as school quality, which will
reduce the cost of having high quality children, and will be more likely to induce a change in
households’ permanent behavior. Allowing its rural economy to dwindle is not only unsustainable
for Ukraine’s long term growth, but is inefficient. Given that educational attainment in Ukraine
remains high, a large pool of potential human capital exists. Investments into education where
households face few alternative schooling options will encourage families to invest in larger
families that will consist of increasingly higher human capital over time.
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8. Tables
Table 1a- Rural Summary Statistics Females 20-40
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
N_ch 1.321 (0.923)
age 30.171 (6.404)
HHinc 19.469 (15.089)
lnmwage 5.534 (.715)
lnfwage 5.650 (.060)
st_ratio 9.458 (3.108)
teachq 0.799 (0.136)
parentDon 8.943 (6.16)
moved 0.454 (0.498)
cbr 0.028 (0.011)
educ 5.792 (2.093)
language 0.338 (0.473)
catholic 0.139 (0.347)
agindust 0.156 (0.364)
health 2.841 (0.648)
cost_med 98.850 (958.930)
Observations 639
HHinc (multiplied by a factor of 10,000), lnmwage (log
male monthly wage), ln fwage (log female monthly wage)
expressed in hryven. st_ratio is number of students per
teacher. teachq is percent teachers with higher teaching de-
gree. parentdon is hryven donated by parents to schools
in the past month. moved is a dummy for having moved.
cbr is the crude birth rate. educ ranges from group 1-
9. language, catholic, and ag_indust are dummies for be-
ing catholic, a Russian speaker, or working in the agri-
cultural/industrial sector. Health is a self evaluation of
health: 1(=Verygood)to4(= Bad).cost_med is hryven spent
on medical services in the past month.
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Table 1b- Urban Summary Statistics Females 20-40
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
N_ch 0.98 (0.830)
age 29.843 (6.335)
HHinc 29.93 (20.525)
lnmwage 5.922 (.685)
lnfwage 5.665 (.057)
st_ratio 13.262 (1.804)
teachq 0.894 (0.085)
parentDon 20.985 (23.046)
moved 0.401 (0.49)
cbr 0.023 (0.01)
educ 6.617 (2.38)
language 0.679 (0.467)
catholic 0.059 (0.236)
agindust 0.113 (0.316)
health 2.732 (0.628)
cost_med 63.724 (142.488)
Observations 843
HHinc (multiplied by a factor of 10,000), lnmwage (log
male monthly wage), ln fwage (log female monthly wage)
expressed in hryven. st_ratio is number of students per
teacher. teachq is percent teachers with higher teaching de-
gree. parentdon is hryven donated by parents to schools in
the past month. moved is a dummy for having moved. cbr
is the crude birth rate. educ ranges from group 1-9. language,
catholic, and ag_indust are dummies for being catholic, a Rus-
sian speaker, or working in the agricultural/industrial sector.
Health is a self evaluation of health: 1(= Verygood)to4(=
Bad).cost_med is hryven spent on medical services in the past
month.
Table 2-Quantiles of School Quality
Quantile HHinc lnmwage educ age
1 1.891 1.683 5.562 30.858
(0.118) (0.204) (0.166) (0.472)
2 1.747 2.402 5.815 29.159
(0.111) (0.229) (0.165) (0.522)
3 2.363 2.362 5.627 29.968
(0.132) (0.229) (0.161) (0.498)
4 1.786 2.847 6.187 30.652
(0.109) (0.235) (0.166) (0.531)
Fstat 5.06 4.94 2.87 2.29
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Table 3-Gpoisson: Females 20-40 in Rural Settlements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All ch: Poisson All ch: G Poisson parent donations moved CBR
year -127.7*** -116.0*** -116.5*** -116.6*** -115.2***
(-16.75) (-13.44) (-13.71) (-13.37) (-13.32)
(-17.43) (-12.14) (-13.65) (-11.51) (-12.51)
HHinc -0.125*** -0.0810** -0.0710** -0.0767** -0.0688**
(-3.544) (-2.469) (-2.226) (-2.306) (-2.122)
(-3.371) (-1.890) (-1.677) (-1.709) (-1.457)
lnmwage 0.107*** 0.0543*** 0.0581*** 0.0500*** 0.0511***
(5.872) (2.985) (3.167) (2.724) (2.872)
(3.589) (1.019) (1.170) (0.766) (0.902)
st_ratio -0.0812 -0.133** -0.138** -0.164*** -0.142***
(-1.500) (-2.489) (-2.571) (-2.981) (-2.722)
(-1.310) (-1.973) (-2.022) (-2.362) (-2.029)
teachq 0.208* 0.282** 0.288** 0.302*** 0.269**
(1.775) (2.509) (2.526) (2.700) (2.541)
(1.493) (2.006) (2.001) (2.001) (1.953)
parentDon -0.0559**
(-2.146)
(-1.321)
moved 0.0368**
(2.091)
(2.105)
cbr 0.0818*
(1.669)
(1.635)
Observations 639 639 639 639 639
dispersion 0.752 0.746 0.758 0.752
N_clust 102 102 102 102 102
AIC 1587 1465 1465 1465 1465
z statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
z statistics in parentheses. The second set of z statistics were obtained using block bootstrap-
ping(with replacement, reps=500) when computationally possible. Significance (*) is based on
non-bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 4-Gpoission: Females 25-35 in Rural Settlements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All ch: Poisson All ch: G Poisson parent donations moved CBR
year -94.65*** -88.75*** -89.57*** -89.13*** -85.02***
(-7.427) (-7.467) (-7.621) (-7.542) (-7.722)
(-7.480) (-7.090) (-7.087) (-6.793) (-7.300)
HHinc -0.0901** -0.0385 -0.0322 -0.0346 -0.0173
(-2.316) (-1.208) (-1.000) (-1.053) (-0.530)
(-2.357) (-0.802) (-0.634) (-0.726) (-0.348)
lnmwage 0.0444* -0.0130 -0.00887 -0.0157 -0.0226
(1.672) (-0.512) (-0.342) (-0.614) (-0.917)
(3.320) (0.713) (0.906) (0.637) (0.377)
st_ratio -0.126** -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.194*** -0.203***
(-2.221) (-3.130) (-3.166) (-3.332) (-3.600)
(-1.878) (-1.980) (-1.974) (-2.290) (-2.089)
teachq 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.497*** 0.481*** 0.492***
(4.334) (5.038) (5.118) (5.072) (5.345)
(3.269) (3.385) (3.411) (3.300) (3.507)
parentDon -0.0447
(-1.341)
(-1.120)
moved 0.0134
(0.604)
(0.278)
cbr 0.138***
(2.777)
(2.181)
Observations 405 405 405 405 405
dispersion 0.682 0.678 0.682 0.680
AIC 1087 967.0 967.6 968.7 963.7
N_clust 100 100 100 100 100
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
z statistics in parentheses. The second set of z statistics were obtained using block bootstrap-
ping(with replacement, reps=500) when computationally possible. Significance (*) is based on
non-bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 6-Gpoisson: Females 20-40 in Urban Settlements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All ch: Poisson All ch: Gpoisson parent donation moved CBR
year -143.1*** -123.5*** -124.0*** -124.1*** -122.0***
(-17.29) (-13.50) (-13.64) (-13.58) (-13.77)
HHinc -0.182*** -0.0936** -0.115** -0.0822* -0.0915**
(-3.671) (-2.007) (-1.991) (-1.801) (-1.971)
lnmwage 0.129*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 0.118***
(8.173) (6.492) (6.205) (6.813) (6.796)
st_ratio -0.141 0.0653 -0.0133 -0.00773 0.194
(-0.959) (0.442) (-0.0842) (-0.0491) (1.635)
teachq 0.364 0.501** 0.508** 0.500** 0.383
(1.425) (2.003) (2.011) (2.060) (1.590)
parentDon 0.0413
(1.296)
moved 0.0554***
(3.838)
cbr 0.127**
(2.309)
Observations 843 843 843 843 843
dispersion 0.810 0.805 0.808 0.809
AIC 1843 1748 1747 1742 1745
N_clust 77 77 77 77 77
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
z statistics in parentheses
Table 7-Gpoisson: Females 25-35 in Urban Settlements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All ch: Poisson All ch: Gpoisson parent donation moved CBR
year -121.2*** -79.23*** -80.45*** -80.25*** -68.42***
(-5.089) (-3.084) (-3.099) (-3.119) (-2.833)
HHinc -0.228*** -0.165*** -0.179*** -0.171*** -0.160***
(-3.653) (-3.515) (-3.222) (-3.502) (-3.522)
lnmwage 0.134*** 0.0985*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.107***
(5.363) (3.615) (3.573) (3.911) (3.964)
st_ratio -0.212 0.205 0.118 0.0705 0.383**
(-1.162) (1.173) (0.539) (0.421) (2.123)
teachq 0.274 0.486* 0.495* 0.479* 0.287
(0.976) (1.716) (1.730) (1.710) (1.002)
parentDon 0.0385
(0.951)
moved 0.0762***
(3.016)
cbr 0.168***
(2.681)
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
dispersion 0.764 0.763 0.760 0.761
N_clust 69 69 69 69 69
AIC 939.3 872.6 873.5 868.3 870.5
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
z statistics in parentheses
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Table 9-Late Births: Females 25-35 in Rural Settlements
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Gpoisson Probit
priorbirths -0.330*** -1.274***
(-6.610) (-6.579)
year -213.0*** -0.130***
(-7.156) (-6.055)
HHinc -0.339*** -235.5***
(-3.717) (-4.698)
lnmwage 0.180*** 0.177***
(5.056) (6.922)
st_ratio -0.127 0.00749
(-0.895) (0.494)
teachq 0.590** 0.857**
(2.128) (2.242)
Constant 257.6***
(6.049)
Observations 405 405
N_clust 100 100
AIC 827.7
z statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10-Time Ratios from Hazard Estimates: Females 25-35 in Rural Settlements
(1) (2)
VARIABLES 1st marriage to 1st birth 1st to 2nd birth
(gamma) (log-log)
year 1.003 1.189***
(0.227) (5.153)
HHinc 0.187 7.74e+92**
(-0.0636) (2.258)
lnmwage 1.013 0.955
(0.942) (-1.060)
mafb 1.260***
(4.368)
teachq 1.395 0.156**
(1.340) (-2.053)
st_ratio 1.009 1.017
(0.917) (0.333)
Constant 0.0485 0***
(-0.134) (-5.122)
ln_sig 0.658***
(-8.118)
kappa 0.703**
(-2.326)
ln_gam 1.211***
(3.787)
Observations 274 354
Robust z statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All coefficients expressed time ratios, i.e. exponentiated form. Estimations for duration between first marriage and
first birth only include marriages which occurred before first birth.
36
Table 11- Difference in means test for
urban/rural teacher quality
Village teachq Urban teachq
Mean 0.79 0.89
ttest 15.6
Difference in means test for young/old
urban teacher quality
Young teachq Old teachq
Mean 0.89 0.898
ttest 1.28
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9. Appendix
The household maxmizes its utility U(N,Q,S),where N, is the number of children, Q is the quality of
children, and S are all other commodities, subject to the budget constraint:
F ≥ NQΠ+ pNN+ pQQ+ pSS
First order conditions for a maximum: UN(N,Q,S) = λ [ΠQ+ pN ]
UQ(N,Q,S) = λ [ΠN+ pQ]
US(N,Q,S) = λ pS
F ≥ NQΠ+ pNN+ pQQ+ pSS
Taking a total derivative of 3-5 with respect to Π yields:

UNN UNQ−λΠ UNS
UQN−λΠ UQQ UQS
USN USQ USS


dN
dΠ
dQ
dΠ
dS
dΠ
 =

λQ
λN
0

The Bordered Hessian becomes:

0 QΠ+ pN NΠ+ pQ pS
QΠ+ pN UNN UNQ−λΠ UNS
NΠ+ pQ UQN−λΠ UQQ UQS
pS USN USQ USS


0
dN
dΠ
dQ
dΠ
dS
dΠ
 =

−NQ
λQ
λN
0

Solving for dNdΠ and
dQ
dΠ by Cramer’s rule, where Φ is the determinant of the bordered Hessian, and φi j are
cofactors, we have:
(7) dNdΠ =
λQφ22
Φ − λNφ32Φ +NQφ12Φ
(8) dQdΠ =
λNφ33
Φ − λQφ23Φ −NQφ13Φ
The first terms are constrained to be negative since own price effects from a change in the fixed costs of N
and Q, pN and pQ, respectively are necessarily negative:
dN
dpN
= λφ22Φ < 0 and
dQ
dpQ
= λφ33Φ < 0
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Assuming that N and S, and Q and S, are complements, while N and Q are substitutes:
φ22 = [p2SUQQ+(NΠ+ pQ)2USS]− [(NΠ+ pQ)UQSpS+ pSUSQ((NΠ+ pQ)]< 0
given that UQQ < 0, USS < 0, and UQS > 0.
φ32 = [p2S(UNQ−λΠ)+USS(QΠ+ pN)(NΠ+ pN)]− [pSUNS(NΠ+ pQ)+ pSUSQ(QΠ+ pN)]< 0
if UNQ < 0, USS < 0, UNS > 0, and USQ > 0
Which implies that Φ> 0
Solving for dNdF and
dQ
dF by taking total derivatives of 3-5 with respect to F yields the Bordered Hessian:
0 QΠ+ pN NΠ+ pQ pS
QΠ+ pN UNN UNQ−λΠ UNS
NΠ+ pQ UQN−λΠ UQQ UQS
pS USN USQ USS


0
dN
dΠ
dQ
dΠ
dS
dΠ
 =

0
0
0
1

dN
dF =
φ42
Φ =
−φ12
Φ and
dQ
dF =
φ43
Φ =
−φ13
Φ
where −φ12 =−[psUQQUNS+USQUQS(QΠ+PN)+USS(QΠ+ pN)(NΠ+ pN)(NΠ+ pN)]
+ [UQQUSS(QΠ+ pN)+(UNQ−λΠ)UQSpS+UNSUSQ(NΠ+ pQ)] whose sign is ambiguous.
Finally, (7) and (8) become a system of partial differential equations for N and Q in terms of Π and F as in
Rosenzweig (1982):
(7) dNdΠ =
λQφ22
Φ − λNφ32Φ −NQdNdF
(8) dQdΠ =
λNφ33
Φ − λQφ23Φ −NQdQdF
Disregarding the ambiguous sign on the income effect, and using that Φ> 0, then
dN
dΠ < 0 if the own price effect dominates from a change in Π
dN
dΠ > 0 if the cross price effect dominates from a change in Π
39
